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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARCELL PITCHER,
Plaintiff anrl Respondent,
vs.

C. W. LAURITZEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Civil No.
10563

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATE_MENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover the reasonable value
of hay and straw unlawfully taken from the plaintiff,
and a counterclaim to specifically enforce an earnest
money contract for the sale of the farm from which the
hay and straw were taken, and failing that. for damages
for breach of contract.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The issues as to the value of the hay and straw,
and whether the earnest money contract had been re1

pudiated were tried to a jury, and the remaining issues
were tried to the court. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment, and a
decree in his favor for specific performance of the earnest
money contract, or failing that, for a new trial under
the direction of this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff as "Seller" and the defendant as "Purchaser" executed a document entitled, "Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase'', dated April 16, 1962,
which provides for the sale of the "220-acre Pitcher
farm, 60-acre Bambrough farm and 160-acre Weston
farm together with all water rights, owner's interest in
well, pump and sprinkler pipe" for $100,000.00. The
sum of $100.00 was deposited and the contract provides,
"Balance of purchase price to be paid as follows 30
acres in North Logan as indicated by map valued at
$50,000.00, $25,000.00 cash from loan on Seller's farm,
and Seller to carry balance on contract or second mortgage at 5% interest."
The plaintiff remained m possession of the land
referred to in the contract and in 1962 produced crops
of hay, grain and sugar beets. (Tr. 153, 154). Meanwhile, the defendant caused his 30 acres of land in
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North Logan to be surveyed and a legal description of
the land to be prepared. (Tr. 74, 158, 159). The plaintiff delivered his abstract to the Hickman Abstract
Company to be brought to date for use in an effort to
obtain the necessary $25,000.00 loan. (Tr. 73).
The defendant talked to Ravsten, the plaintiff's
real estate broker, every two weeks in an effort to gel
the deal completed. (Tr. 70). He also inquired about
the operation of the farm in 1962. (Tr. 82). Ravsten
called the plaintiff on several occasions to get him to
keep an appointment with the defendant, and each cime
he was told he was too busy. (Tr. 88, 89).
Ravsten undertook to obtain the necessary $25,000.00 loan for his principal. He got a commitment
for a $25,000.00 loan on the North Logan land from
First Federal. (Tr. 127). This was reported to the
plaintiff and he said "he was not interested in taking
the loan." (Tr. 150, 151).
In August of 1962, the defendant, who was engaged
in the dairy business, needed hay. (Tr. 66, 67, 86). His
son Arden Lauritzen, called plaintiff's agent, Ravsten,
and then went up to plaintiff's home to get hay and
straw. He met plaintiff at the farm and asked him if
it was all right to take the hay.
" ... 'Certainly,' he said, 'take any of the hay
you want,' he said. 'However, I'd recommend
that you get this one particular stack which lay
on the east side of the highway running to 'Veston.' He s,aid, 'It's down in a hollow and there's
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a poor road at the time to it, and when the weather
is bad, it's impassable. I recommend you get
that before snow.'
Q. And did you have any further conversations with him? Did he make any other statements?" (Tr. 95).

"THE COURT: Out by the haystack now.
A. I said, 'How can you go to all of the expense to produce this crop when the farm is going to be transferred to another owner, in view
of the fact that it's going right through the crop
season?' or words to that effect. And he answered
that, well, it was very pressing on him. It was
costing him a lot of money and-but he would
have to have some help on the beets because he'd
spent a tremendous amount of money on the
hand labor part of it, but that the hay and the
grain and the straw were ours.'' (Tr. 153, 154).
In September or October, 1962, Ravsten called
Arden Lauritzen and told him the Pitchers' wanted
the third crop of hay taken off so they could turn their
cattle out. (Tr. 102). Ravsten told defendant that it
was his hay, "come out and get it." (Tr. 193).
The plaintiff did not say anything about the price
of the hay and straw, nor did he orally demand pay·
ment or send any bill. (Tr. 194) . He never asked for
weights. (Tr. 199) . The first time defendant heard that
plaintiff expected to be paid was when he got a letter
from the bank in December, 1963, Defendant's Exhibit
5. He got a letter from plaintiff's attorneys shortly
before the action was filed. (Tr. 196) .
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There is no evidence that the defendant refused
to perform his contract nor that he abandoned it. The
reason the contract was not performed is found in the
testimony of the plaintiff. On cross-examination ~1e
testified as follows:
"Q. Now you testified, as I remember, on direct that you were anxious to make this deal with
Mr. Lauritzen to get money. You needed money
to go into the pipe business.

A. That's correct.
Q. And the reason the deal fell through was
that you couldn't get the money on this property?

A. That's one of the reasons.
Q. Well, what are the other reasons?

A. Well, we were never able to sell the property, no other way of getting-there was no
money forthcoming on this thing.
Q. Well, in other words you were unable to
sell the North Logan property?

A. Correct.

Q. And you were trying to sell that as well as
borrow money on your own property; is that
right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And you were unable to sell the North
Logan property?
A. That's right.
MRS. PITCHER: It was Bennie that was
selling that North Logan property.
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Q. Was it your idea, Mr. Pitcher, that this
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase
exhibit D-1, could not be performed by yo~
unless you were able to sell the North Logan
property?
A. That was the understanding that I had.
Mr. Ravsten said he could sell the property,
and I said if he could sell the property, fine and
dandy, we'd go through with the deal, and that
was the reason we signed it.
Q. And when you signed the agreement, exhbit D-1, did you even read it?

A. I didn't think I had to read it. Mr. Ravsten
told me what he'd do and that there was good
enough for me.
Q. And you didn't even read D-1 before you
signed it?

A. I didn't even read it .... " (Tr. 138-139).

" ... Q. Well, that's the A-number one item,
is it not?
A. "Tell, there are other items involved too.
Been an awful lot of increase in the value of the
property that we have out home. We've put
sprinkler systems and wheel moves, improved
the property in this length of time.
" (Tr.

140).

See also (Tr. 141-142).
The issue of the value of the hay and straw taken
by the defendant was submitted to a jury and the
special verdict was accepted by the court and is within
the evidence. The Jury was also asked to answer the
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question, "Has any party repudiated the earnest money
contract, exhibit l." The answer was "No." (R. 24<).
After the special verdict \Vas returned, additional testimony was taken on the remaining issues. (Tr. 118204).

During the trial the defendant tendered a deed to
the North Logan property, offered to pay $25,000.DO
and offered to give a second mortgage to secure another
$25,000.00. (Tr. 158-161). The tender was refused.
(Tr. 161). In his pleadings the defendant offered to
pay the reasonable value of the hay and strav,· in addition to the full purchase price of $100,000.00. (U. ::w j.
It will be noted that the plaintiff pleaded that
there had been no meeting of the minds and had 11en:r
been a contract. (R. 25-29). He also pleaded that the
contract was barred by the statute of frauds and that
the contract was impossible to perform because he could
not get a loan. (R. 25-29). He did not plead abandonment of the contract. The issue of abandonment wm;
never before the court.

The trial court found that the earnest money receipt and offer to purchase was "a valid contract in it<;
inception", but further found that the "agreement was
subsequently abandoned by the parties." See finding
of fact No. 9. (R. 40). It was also found that the
plaintiff could not obtain a loan for $25,000.00 on his
farm and that by reason thereof it was impossible for
him to perform and that therefore he was "excused
of any performance under the terms of the Earnest
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Money Agreement." See finding of fact No. 5. (R. 38).
The court also found that the plaintiff retained possession of his farm during the years 1962, 1963, 1964 and
1965, paid for and harvested crops during those years
and made valuable improvements in the sum of $20,·
000.00 and that it would be inequitable and unjust
to grant specific performance. ( R. 39, 40) . The trial
court also found the value of the hay and straw to
be as determined by the jury. (R. 39).
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff
for the value of the hay and straw. No disposition is
made in the judgment of the other issues in the case.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
l. The Earnest l\ioney contract

enforceable.

is specifically

2. The finding of impossibility of performance is

not supported by the evidence and is contrary to law.
3. Improvement of the farm after contracting for

its sale is not ground for denying specific performance.
4. There is no evidence that the defendant aban·

doned the contract.
5. The court permitted the plaintiff to take advan·

tage of his own default and erred in denying equitable
relief.
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ARGUMENT
1. THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT IS

SPECIFICALLY ENFORCEABLE.
The law is well settled that "in order to do justice or prevent injustice" a valid contract for the sale
of real estate may be specifically enforced.
81 C.J.S. 476, 486
Nielsen vs. Rucker, 8 Utah 2d 302, 333 P.2d
1067
Johnson vs. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893
Genola Town vs. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88,
80 P.2d 930
In the cases of Johnson vs. Jones, supra, and Nielsen vs. Rucker, supra, this court affirmed decrees specifically enforcing earnest money agreement closely
resembling that involved in this suit.
Equity will not permit a party to evade a contractual obligation merely because such party has changed
his mind.
Johnson vs. Jones, supra; Volk vs. Atlantic
Acceptance & Realty Co., 139 N.J. Eq. 171, 50
A.2d 488.
In the Volk case the court said:
"It is one thing to decline to compel a person
to perform an agreement into which he has never
decidedly entered and quite another to permit
him to escape a peremptory contractual obligation merely because he has changed his mind.
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The eye of equity must always strive to pierce
every curtain of artifice."
The trial court in the instant case made a finding
(No. 9) the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was a valid contract in its inception, (R. 40) but
refused to order specific performance for three reasons,
( 1) that the plaintiff had failed in an attempt to borrow $25,000.00 on his farm making performance impossible, ( 2) that since the execution of the contract
the plaintiff had made valuable improvements which
would unjustly enrich the defendants (R. 39, 40) and
( 3) that the parties had abandoned the contract. These
three reasons for denying equitable relief will be discussed under separate headings.
2. THE FINDINGS OF IMPOSSIBILITY

OF PERFORMANCE IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY
TO LAW.
The only evidence in the record relating to the
question of impossibility is that Ravsten on behalf of
the plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for loans on the
farm. A loan was approved by Prudential Insurance
Company in the amount of $12,600.00. See Exhibit
D-9 (Tr. 123, 124). Ravsten approached the Federal
Land Bank and Utah Mortgage Loan, but no loan
commitment was made. (Tr. 126).
The general rule is that impossibility arising subsequent to the making of a contract does not excme
performance.
10

17A C.J.S. p. 607
Impossibility of performance originating in financial incapacity is not a defense.
6 Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. Sec. 1932,
p. 5412
Martin vs. Star Pub. Co., (Del.) II Terry
181, 126 A.2d 238
Lewis vs. Harcliff Coal Co., 237 F. Supp. 6
The obvious reason the $25,000.00 loan on the
farm was not obtained was that the plaintiff already had
it mortgaged to the Farmers' Home Administratiou
for $23,000.00 and there was an "escrow" indebtedness of $8,000.00 on the Bambrough land (near Cornish). (Tr. 130, 137). However, before the trial the
plaintiff borowed $14,000.00 on the Bambrough property. (Tr. 130).
When Ravsten had difficulty borrowing money on
the plaintiff's farm he applied to the First Federal for
a loan on the plaintiff's farm and the North Logaa
property. It was approved for $25,000.00. (Tr. 127).
There was no action on it. Some months later the plaintiff "indicated an interest in picking up the loan as a
source of getting money", but he could not get the
loan then. (Tr. 128, 129).
Under the circumstances of this case the following
legal principle is applicable:
" ... 'Vhere a contract is performable on the
occurrence of a future event, there is an implied
11

agreement that the promisor will place no obstacle in the way of the happening of such event,
particularly where it is dependent in whole or
in part on his own act; and, where he prevents,
hinders, or renders impossible, the fulfillment of
a condition precedent or its performance by the
adverse party, or is himself the cause of failure
to perform the condition, he cannot rely on such
condition to defeat his liability. A party who
prevents the fulfillment of a condition of his own
obligation commits a breach of contract; and a
party whose misconduct has rendered it futile
as a practical matter, for the other party to fulfill a condition cannot complain of his failure
to do so ... " 17A C.J.S. p. 645.
See also 6 Corbin on Contracts, sec. 1329 p. 346.
It is evident from the testimony of the plaintiff
that the defense of impossibility is a subterfuge for
the reasons stated above and for the additional reason
that the plaintiff did not intend to perform unless the
North Logan property was sold. (Tr. 138, 139).
"Q. Was it your idea, 1\1-r. Pitcher, that this
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, exhibit D-1, could not be performed by you unless
you were able to sell the North Logan property?

A. That was the understanding that I had.
1\1-r. Ravsten said he could sell the property, and
I said if he could sell the property, fine and
dandy, we'd go through with the deal, and that
was the reason we signed it.

Q. And when you signed the agreement, exhibit D-1, did you even read it?
A. I didn't think I had to read it. Mr. Ravste11
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told me what he'd do and that there was good
enough for me.
Q. And you didn't even read D-1 before you
signed it?

A. I didn't even read it." (Tr. 139).
3. IMPROVEMENT OF THE F ARl\1 AFTER CONTRACTING FOR ITS SALE IS NO
GROUND FOR DENYING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The trial court made a finding that during the years
1962-1965 the plaintiff made valuable improvements
on the farm in the sum of $20,000.00, and that it would
be "inequitable and unjust to attempt to grant specific
performance.... " If this reasoning is sound, a party
seeking to avoid his obligation to perform a real estate
contract could simply improve the real estate. The la"·
does not support such a contention.
In the case of Erisman vs. Overman, 11 Utah 2d
268, 358 P.2d 85, the party in possession under a real
estate contract made a claim for the value of improYements voluntarily made on the premises. This court
held:
" ... As to any claim for improvements made
voluntarily by the defendant, there is nothing
in this case that would justify any claim therefor in law or in equity since they were made
under circumstances that would not bind plaintiffs by any equitable doctrine of estoppel or
the like, or under any legal or statutory interdiction . . . . "
13

4. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE

DEFENDANT
TRACT.

ABANDONED

THE

CON-

The trial court made a finding that the agreement
was abandoned by the parties. (R. 40, Finding No. 9).
Proof of mutual abandonment involves not only the
acts but the intentions of both parties. The following
evidence shows a consistent effort on the part of the
defendant to obtain performance by the plaintiff.
The defendant: ( 1) Talked with the plaintiff's agent
Ravsten at least once every two weeks to find out why
the transfer papers were not completed and to check
up on the crops. (Tr. 70). See also Ravsten's testimony
to this effect. (Tr. 82) . ( 2) Had the North Logan
property surveyed and legal descriptions prepared. 1
(Tr. 74, 158, 159). (3) Had a map prepared by au
engineer when the property was surveyed and furnished
it to Ravsten in the fall of 1962. (Tr. 159). ( 4) Removed hay and straw from the farm when the plaintiff
said it belonged to defendant. (Tr. 153, 154). ( 5)
Offered to pay Pitcher $2,000.00 for the hay in August, 1962, if he would perform his agreement. (Tr.
195). ( 6) Offered to pay $25,000.00 cash instead of
requiring Pitcher to borrow that sum on his farm. (Tr.
161). (7) Had his attorney write letters to the plaintiff in August and September, 1963, demanding that
he perform. (See Exhibits 2 and 3.) ( 8) Never failed
or refused to perform. (Tr. 73). (8) Had his abstract
brought to date and all transfer papers prepared. (Tr. '
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73) . ( l 0) Tendered a deed to the North Logan property, $25,000.00 cash and a second mortgage for another $25,000.00 in open court. (Tr. 161).
None of the facts above stated are controverted.
There is no evidence in the record of any act of statement indicating that the defendant abandoned the contract. Absent proof of abandonment by both parties,
the trial court erred in making finding of fact No. 9.
Mutual abandonment involves an intention on the part
of both parties to rescind or forsake the contract.
Green vs. Garn, II Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050
See also 6 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1826
5. THE COURT PERMITTED THE PLAIN-

TIFF TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OWN
DEFAULT AND ERRED IN DENYING
EQUITABLE RELIEF.
The plaintiff admitted on cross-examination that
he had not even read the agreement before signing it
and that he had never intended to "go through with
the deal" until the North Logan property was sold.
(Tr. 138, 139). The reasons for the evasions and delay
are clarified by this cross-examination. The fault was
all on the side of the plaintiff and yet the trial court
permitted the plaintiff to use his own evasions and delay
to defeat the defendant's clear right to equitable relief.
This was manifestly error.
The writer of this brief has never seen a more
callous disregard of an obligation nor a more obvious
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effort to repudiate. Near the close of the testimony
the court asked the plaintiff if he would perform if
the defendant should give him $25,000.00 in cash, a deed
to the North Logan property and a note secured by
a mortgage on the plaintiff's property for another
$25,000.00. His answer vvas, "No, I couldn't do it, not
on that."
To carry out such a proposal the defendant offered
in open court to pay $25,000.00 and to sign a note and
mortgage and he tendered a deed to the 30-acre tract
in North Logan. This was ref used. This off er would
get for the seller the $100,000.00 purchase price set
out in the agreement. In addition, the purchaser offered in his amended pleading to pay for the hay and
straw if specific performance was ordered. This would
clearly meet his obligation "to do equity."
A practical solution was reached in a similar case.
See Haire vs. Patterson, (\Vashington) 386 P.2d 953:
" . . . The earnest money agreement, considered in its entirety, contains all of the ingredients necessary for a cash sale. The buyers are
granted the option to pay the full consideration
at any time, and the seller is obligated to accept
the same. The seller has agreed to convey a merchantable title by 'warranty deed, free of encumbrances except - - - ' (No exceptions noted).
The buyers may waive defects in title and elect
to purchase subject to them. Encumbrances may
be paid out of the purchase money at the time of
closing sale. The preliminary title report showed
the property subject to the lien of a mortgage
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I

to l<...,ederal Land Bank with an unpaid balance
of about $888.29, a second mortgage to secure
an indebtedness in the original amount of
$646.07, and a judgment for $55.05, plus interest and costs. It further disclosed the existence of an easement for travel and utilities lines
over a strip 16 feet in width, and an oil, gas,
an.d mineral lease entered into in 1959 for a 10year term with I-lumble Oil & Refining Company. We conclude that, if the respondents desire the property at this time for $20,000 in
cash and are willing to accept title subject to
the foregoing easement and oil and gas lease,
they are entitled to have it.
The cause is remanded to the trial court 'with
instructions to modify the judgment upon the
going down of the remittitur by eliminating
therefrom everything after the first paragraph
ending with the words, 'NO~T THEREFORE,' and by inserting in lieu thereof the following:
'It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed
that, in the event that within 30 days from the
date hereof plaintiffs shall pay into the registry
of this court the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000), which sum shall be subject to
the further order of the court, and shall notify
defendant in writing of such deposit and of their
election to accept title subject to the easement
for travel and utility lines, and the oil and gas
lease to Humble Oil & Refining Company, then
the defendant is hereby directed to carry out
and perform all acts necessary to effect a sale
of the property described in Plaintiff's Exhibit
I in accordance with the terms thereof in the
same manner as though the plaintiffs had elected
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to pay the entire consideration in cash. The said
Exhibit I shall be considered as having been executed on the date on which plaintiffs shall notify
the defendant of their having made the afor~
said deposit into the registry of the court, and
the time for the performance of the various acts
required of the parties in said Exhibit I shall
commence to run from said date. Upon the complete performance by the plaintiffs and the defendant of all acts necessary to consummate said
sale, the court shall enter such further order
relative to the deposit in the registry of the court
as may appear equitable.
'In the event that plaintiffs shall fail within
said period of 30 days to make such deposit and
notify defendant thereof, this action shall be
dismissed with prejudice upon motion of defendant.
'The court hereby retains jurisdiction of this
cause for the purpose of making such orders from ·
time to time as the court may deem necessary
and proper to make effective and to complete the
specific performance of any and all acts required
by this decree.'
As so modified, the judgment is hereby af·
firmed . . . . "
1

See also the case of Darneille vs. Geraci, ( :\Iary·
land) 205 A.2d 55, in which the court ordered specific
performance against a vendor who was evasive anrl
sought to repudiate a contract for the sale of land. This
case is so closely in point on the facts and the law that
we quote from it at length:
"'Yhen as here it became clear that the sellers
-by belately claiming that the contract of sale
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was too indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous to
specifically enforced-had no intention of going
through with the sale in any event if that could
be avoided, the purchaser was thereby required
either to accept the title as it was and tender
payment into court or take the risk of possibly
losing his suit for specific performance. Chapman vs. Thomas, 211 Md. 102, 126 A.2d .579
( 1956) . In such case, the general rule is to the
effect that where uncertainties exist in the terms
of a contract of sale, specific performance should
be granted when cash is tendered in full payment of the purchase price. And where credit
is provided for, as was the case here, it is the
privilege of the purchaser in the absence of some
indication to the contrary, to waive all uncertainties relating to the extension of credit by
tendering the whole (or balance) of the purchase price. Ordinarily, tender not only waives
all defects or uncertainties in the terms of credit,
but also waives all other uncertain terms, when
as here they are primarily for the benefit of the
purchaser. In addition to Haire vs. Patterson,
supra, see Blanton vs. Williams, 209 Ga. 16,
70 S.E. 461 (1952); Levine vs. Lafayette Illdg.
Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 121, 142 A. 441 (1928);
Binns vs. Smith, 93 N.J. Eq. 33. 115 A. 69
( 1921) ; Morris vs. Ballard, 56 App. D.C. 383,
16 F.2d 175, 49 A.L.R. 1461 (1926). See also
5 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.) sec. 1424.
The defendants also contend that the offer to
pay $245,000 into court came too late. "Then,
however, a purchaser is at all time able, ready
and willing to perform, a tender before trial is
not necessary where the seller has expressed his
intention not to perform."
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CONCLUSION
'l'he trial court found that there was a valid contract, and then refused to specifically enforce it for
reasons set out in the findings of fact consisting of impossibility of performance, improvement of the premises by the plaintiff and mutual abandonment. We have
pointed out above that the mere failure of the plaintiff
to get a loan application approved for $25,000.00 does
not constitute "impossibility," especially in view of the
fact that a loan was offered on other security for the
full amount and the defendant actually offered to pay
the $25,000.00 in cash. The second reason for denying
relief to the defendant, namely, that after selling the
property the plaintiff placed valuable improvements
thereon is equally without merit. 'l'he finding of mutual
abandonment is not sustained by any competent evidence.
The defendant, who at all times was ready, able
and willing to perform his contract, and who consistently sought, through the plaintiff's agent, Ravsten,
to get the plaintiff to perform, is entitled to specific
performance under such terms and conditions as will
be just to both parties.
Respectfully submitted,

E. J. SKEEN

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant
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